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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAISY HELEN KINSLEY, sometimes
known as HELEN D. KINSLEY,
Individually and as Executrix of the
Estate of Otho V. Kinsley, also known
as Otho Verne Kinsley, Deceased,

Plaintiff & Appellant,

v.
LE\VIS H. LARSEN and
DOROTHY G. LARSEN, his wife,
Individually, and doing business as
LARSEN ENTERPRISES and
BELCO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendants & Respondents.

Case No.
10339

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover monies wrongfully paid
by defendant Belco Petroleum Corporation to defendant
Lewis H. Larsen as purported agent of plaintiff, and
misappropriated by him, in connection with the purchase of oil and gas interests by defendC\Ilt Belco Petroleum Corporation.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Prior to trial, on motion of defendant Belco Petroleum Corporation, Summary Judgment was granted
against plaintiff in favor of Belco Petroleum Corporation
dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as to it ( R 72, 73). The
issues have not been resolved as between plaintiff and
other respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Summary J udgment dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as to respondent
Belco Petroleum Corporation, and judgment in her favor
as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Otho V. Kinsley, a resident of Tucson, Arizona, prior
to his death on March 28, 1962, was the owner of an
undivided one-half interest in certain royalties and working interests under two State of Utah oil and gas leases
on lands in San Juan County, Utah (R 2, 29, 60). The
defendants Lewis H. Larsen and Dorothy G. Larsen, his
wife, were owners of the other undivided one-half interest (R 3, 13, 29). This action is brought by plaintiff as
the widow and executrix of the estate of Otho V. Kinsley
to recover part of the proceeds from the sale of the
parties' interests totalling $384,000.00 paid by the defendant Belco Petroleum Corporation to defendant Lewis
H. Larsen, as agent, without authority on March 22, 1962,
and deposited to his account under the name of Larsen
Enterprises (R 2, 3, 11-14, 29). Under date of March 31,
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1962, Larsen remitted $92,000.00 to Kinsley in Tucson,
and withheld the sum of $100,000.00 due Kinsley (R 3,
7, 29). On August 6, 1963, subsequent to the filing of
the suit and attachment, the sum of $22,400.11 was paid
to plaintiff by Larsen but the balance of the $100,000.00
was never turned over to decedent or plaintiff ( R 4a,
29) . The defendant Lewis H. Larsen concedes that he
owes plaintiff the sum of $77,599.89, plus interest, but
the defendant, Dorothy G. Larsen, denies that she is a
partner in Larsen Enterprises, or that she is liable ( R 4a,
29).
Pursuant to a motion under Rule 56, U.R.C.P.,
Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint
against Belco Petroleum Corporation was entered on
March 3, 1965, after the court concluded that the following telegram sent by Otho V. Kinsley, the deceased,
to Lewis H. Larsen on February 12, 1962, constituted
an appointment of Larsen as the agent of Kinsley to sell
the mineral interests and to receive payment from Belco
Petroleum Corporation (R 72, 73) :
Pursuant to our telephone call this evening,
this will be your authority to dispose of our interest at not less than $160,000.00 or any amount
greater for which you dispose of your interest.
Otho V. Kinsley
On or about March 16, 1962, the defendant, Belco
Petroleum Corporation, without notice to, or prior approval of deceased or plaintiff, entered into an agreement with the defendant Lewis H. Larsen under the
terms of which Belco agreed to pay direct to Larsen, as
agent, the total sum of $384,000.00 in payment of the
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respective interests of the Kinsleys and the Larsens in
and to the oil and gas leases in question (Ex. 10, Deposition of Lewis H. Larsen, taken at the instance of
defendant Belco). No notice was given to Kinsleys by
Belco Petroleum Corporation, or its attorneys, that such
agreement was entered into, or of the amount agreed
upon for the sale of said interests or of the fact that
Belco intended to make payment to Lewis H. Larsen, as
agent ( R 66) , although Belco Petroleum Corporation
and its attorney repeatedly sent many legal documents
to Otho V. Kinsley for execution and return in connection with sale after the agreement and prior to
payment to Larsen ( R 50, 65, 66). Kinsleys returned
the various documents to Larsen, who then delivered
them to Belco ( R 50) . No formal power of attorney
authorizing the defendants Lewis H. Larsen or Dorothy
G. Larsen, his wife, or Larsen Enterprises to act as
agent in dealing with the property or for receipt of the
money for the plaintiff or deceased was ever delivered
or recorded in the office of the County Recorder of
San Juan County, Utah, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 57-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (R 4a, 29).
Previously, on about November 2, 1960, defendant
Lewis H. Larsen had advised Belco Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Belco) to make all payments for moneys due Kinsleys under the leases to them
in Tucson, Arizona (R 5, 30). Under date of March 7,
1961, Belco sent certain clarification documents to the
deceased Otho V. Kinsley, together with an oil division
order which was signed and returned to defendant Belco
Petroleum Corporation requiring payment for oil runs to
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be made to the Kinsleys, and the Kinsleys in fact periodically received the proceeds of their share of the royalty
and other payments under the leases direct from Belco
at all times prior to March 26, 1962 (R 65, 66, 67a).
At no time prior to the payment by Belco Petroleum
Corporation to Lewis H. Larsen, as agent, did Belco or
L. E. Eggertsen, as its attorney, or Lewis H. Larsen, or
anyone, advise the plaintiff or the deceased that the
proceeds of the sale of the oil interests were to be paid
to Lewis H. Larsen, as agent ( R 65, 66). Nor did Belco
advise plaintiff or the deceased that it was entering into
an agreement with Lewis H. Larsen, under the terms of
which Larsen was to be paid the moneys due the Kinsleys
for their interests in and to the oil leases in question ( R
66). Neither plaintiff, nor the deceased, were parties to
the purported agreement of March 16, 1962, referred
to in the affidavit of L. E. Eggertsen, attorney for Belco
(Ex. 10, Deposition of Lewis H. Larsen) .
The defendant Larsen admits payment by Belco
to him on March 22, 1962 (R 2, 29) but Larsen, in a
letter dated March 26, 1962, to the deceased Otho V.
Kinsley said: "It appears that the deal will be closed
for the full amount of $192,000.00." (R 6) Lewis H.
Larsen, without advising the decedent Kinsley of the
fact that the money already had been pai~ by Belco
direct to him, he (Larsen) requested a loan from Kinsley
of $100,000.00 for the purpose of buying 1,000 head
of cattle ( R 6) . Otho Kinsley died in Tucson, Arizona
11
on 28, 1962, two days after the above letter was
dated at Salt Lake City by defendant Lewis H. Larsen
( R 6, 60) . The bank stamps on the reverse side of the
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drafts from Belco show without question that the same
were deposited by defendant Lewis H. Larsen, to his
account at Walker Bank & Trust Company on or prior
to the 26th of March, 1962 (R 56-57a).
Under the date of March 31, 1962, at least three
davs after the death of Otho V. Kinsley, Lewis Larsen
fo~arded from Salt Lake City a letter addressed to
Kinsley, enclosing a check for $92,000.00 and a promissory note for $100,000.00 dated April 2, 1962 (R 3, 4,
7, 8) . The promissory note was not accepted by the
deceased or the plaintiff ( R 4, 29), but was retained as
evidence of the indebtedne~ ( R 63 ) .
There is nothing in the record to indicate that
Kinsley had any knowledge of the representations made
by Larsen to Belco, if any, of the scope of his authority
or agency.
The agreement referred to in the counter-affidavit
of plaintiff between Larsen and Belco dated March 12,
1962 is the same agreement as that referred to in the
affidavit of L. E. Eggertsen between Larsen and Belco
as having been dated March 16, 1962 ( R 50, 66). This
latter date is the correct date.
Upon plaintiff's objection to the competency of the
defendant Lewis H. Larsen as a witness under Section
78-24-2(3), U.C.A. 1953, the court on the hearing of
the Motion for Summary Judgment refused to consider
testimony in his deposition pertaining to statements of
the deceased Otho V. Kinsley or transactions with the
decedent. The deposition was taken at the instance of
the defendant Belco and formal objections were made
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prior to the hearing ( R 68) . Plaintiff made a motion
to strike the affidavit of Lawrence Ruben in support of
the Motion for Summary Judgment ( R 70, 71).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DEFENDANT LEWIS H. LARSEN WAS
NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, AUTHORIZED TO
RECEIVE PAYMENT OF THE SALES PRICE OF
THE PROPERTY, AS AGENT, AND SUCH DID
NOT CONSTITUTE PAYMENT TO PRINCIPAL.
The primary issue in this case is whether the telegram from decedent Otho V. Kinsley dated February
12, 1962, to the defendant Lewis H. Larsen in light
of the other evidence and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom at the time of the hearing on the Motion
for Summary Judgment, constituted sufficient authority,
as a matter of law, for Belco Petroleum Corporation to
pay the purchase price for Kinsley's property to the
defendant Lewis H. Larsen as agent.
The other facts and propositions established by the
record are:
1. No proof has been adduced that an express agency existed authorizing Larsen to receive payment as
agent.
2. That the deceased Otho V. Knisley was a record
owner along with Larsen of an undivided one-half interest in the royalty and working interests in the oil and
gas leases involved ( R 29) .
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3. That Belco had made uninterrupted royalty and
other payments under the exact leases involved in this
sale direct to the deceased Otho V. Kinsley in Tucson,
Arizona prior to the sale ( R 66) .
4. That neither Belco nor its attorneys advised
plaintiff or the deceased that the purchase price in
question was to be paid to Lewis H. Larsen as agent ( R
66), even though Belco and its attorney corresponded
with the Kinsleys and repeatedly forwarded documents
of conveyance and assignments to them to be executed
personally in connection with the transaction ( R 65, 50).
5. That the plaintiff or deceased had no knowledge that Belco had entered into the agreement of March
16, 1962, with the defendant Lewis H. Larsen, under
the terms of which payment was to be made direct to
Larsen ( R 66) .
6. That defendant Lewis H. Larsen was admittedly
not a general agent with full powers as evidenced by
the requirement that deceased and plaintiff sign and
execute all documents of conveyances in favor of Belco,
arid Kinsleys then returned the executed documents to
Lewis H. Larsen (R 50).
7. That Lewis H. Larsen advised Belco in 1960
that payments in connection with the oil and gas leases
due the Kinsleys should be sent directly to him in Tucson,
Arizona ( R 5) in accordance with the usual and customary practice of payments to a record owner of an
oil interest ( R 30) .
8. That on March 7, 1961, approximately one year
before the sale, Belco requested a division order to be
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signed in connection with one of the leases, which order
required payments to be made by Belco direct to the
deceased Kinsley ( R 65 ) .
9. That no formal and complete power of attorney
was executed and delivered by Kinsley to Larsen, or
recorded (R 4a, 30).
10. That defendant Lewis H. Larsen had been paid
by Belco and deposited the checks from Belco to his
account at the time he wrote Kinsley requesting a loan
and has never turned over the balance of $100,000.00 to
plaintiff (R 2, 6, 29, 56, 57a).
There existed under these circumstances at most a
limited agency authorizing Larsen to negotiate for a sale
of the mineral interests in question pursuant to the tenns
of the telegram of February 16, 1962. It is, of course, a
general rule that any doubt as to the authority of an
agent to do a particular act is to be resolved against the
agent and those dealing with him. Further, any such
power and the authority granted must be strictly construed and not extended by construction. (2 C.].S. Agency, Sec. 114(bb) page 1328).
Otho V. Kinsley and Lewis H. Larsen were cotenants under the oil and gas leases in question. It is
well settled in Utah that one co-tenant can make no
agreement affecting the interest of another in a property
jointly owned and that such co-tenants are not agents
or partners by virtue of their joint interests. Garner v.
Anderson, ( 1926) 67 Utah 553 at page 563, 248 P. 496.
It has been held that such co-ownership is the antithesis of principal and agent relationships becuause the
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parties are equal in status and ownership. Parker v. McCartney (1959) 216 Ore. 283, 388 P. 2d 371.
Belco was not compelled to deal with Larsen. As a
matter of fact, it dealt jointly with Larsen and Kinsley
but in so choosing to deal with and pay Larsen as an
agent, it must take the risk and deal with such an agent
at its peril. Here the loss to plaintiff and decedent never
would have occurred had Belco properly performed the
duty imposed upon it by law to investigate the authority
of the agent with whom it was dealing. The loss could
have been averted by notice to the decedent that Belco
intended to pay Larsen as agent, or by the simple business-like procedure of making the checks payable jointly
to the record owners of the interest, i.e., both Kinsley
and Larsen. In any event, Belco assumed the risk of
ascertaining the scope of Larsen's powers at its peril.
The oft repeated rule is well stated in 1 Mechem on
Agency (2d Ed.) Sec. 743, page 527:
An assumption of authority to act as agent for
another of itself challenges inquiry. Like a railroad crossing, it should be in itself a sign of danger
and suggest the duty to 'stop look and listen.' It
is therefore declared to be a fundamental rule,
never to be lost sight of and not easily to be overestimated, that persons dealing- with an assumed
agent, whether the assumed ag-ency be a general
o~ special one, are bound at their peril, if they
would hold the principal, to ascertain not only
fact of the agency but the nature and extent of the
authority, and in case either is controverted, the
burden of proof is upon them to establish it.
It is important to bear in mind that Belco did not
rely on Larsen as a general agent and Kinsley and plain-
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tiff were personally required to execute all documents
and conveyances in connection with the transfer ( R 50,
65 ) . If Belco had recognized Larsen as an agent with
other than limited powers, but clothed with the necessary
authority to do any and all things necessary to completf' the sale and execute the documents of conveyance,
there would have been no need for Belco and its attornys to require the deceased and plaintiff to execute the
documents of conveyance, but admittedly Larsen had
no authority to sign the same as attorney-in-fact on
behalf of Kinsley.
The agency was limited and could not be enlarged
by the representations of Larsen. There existed no express agency for Larsen to receive payment from Belco
and any self-serving representations of Larsen whereby
he apparently induced Belco to enter into the agreement
with him to pay him the proceeds of the sale, could
not enlarge the express authority contained in the telegram from Kinsley. Such power is to be strictly construed,
and any doubt as to the scope of the power to do a
particular act is to be resolved against the agent and
those dealing with him. This court, in accordance with
well established general rules, in the case of Dohrmann
Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc. (1940) 99 Utah
188, 103 P. 2d 650, held that the defendant could not
rely on the representation of the agent that he could
make a settlement when the authority granted by a telegram was limited, and that it was the duty of the party
dealing with the agent to ascertain just what his authority and capacity is.
To appellant's knowledge, there are no controlling
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Utah cases. The case of Olsen v. Tholen (1927) 111
Utah 241, 177 P. 2d 75 involves payment to a seller's
agent. But in that case the listing contract specifically
authorized the agent to accept a deposit on the purchase
price and in the event of forfeiture to the buyer, to retain,
out of the sum forfeited an amount equal to his commission, and so it is no authority in the instant case.
The prevailing view and weight of authority is that
authority to sell or to negotiate a sale, does not carry
with it the right to receive from the purchaser the purchase price, or any part thereof. This rule is set out in
2 C.].S. Agency, Sec. 107, page 1276 as follows:
A mere authority to contract for the sale of
realty, unaccompanied by power to convey, carries
with it no authority to collect the purchase price;
and a mere power to deliver a conveyance and
receive the consideration does not entitle the agent
to receive payment thereof, particularly to his own
use; but the language of the appointment, or the
conduct of the principal in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances, may extend the
agent's powers sufficiently for them to embrace
authority to receive payment of the purchase
money.
Here the surrounding facts and circumstances, such
as Belco's dealing with Kinsley as principal after the
date of the telegram and the uninterrupted prior payments by Belco to the Kinsleys actually negate any extension of the scope of authority, and clearly shows that
defendant Lewis H. Larsen was not, as a matter of law,
authorized to receive payment of the sales price of the
property, as agent, and such payment did not constitute
payment to the principal.
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The comment to the Restatement of Agency, Sec.
53, states that unless the price and other terms have
been completely stated by the principal, the normal inference is that an agent authorized "to sell" land and
not given a formal power of attorney, is authorized
merely to find a purchaser. See 30 A.L.R. 2d 810, Sec. 5
and cases cited therein in favor of the following general
rule:
It is generally held or stated that a real estate
broker, under the ordinary contract of employment, giving him authority merely to produce a
purchaser willing to contract with the seller upon
the terms prescribed, or a broker or other agent
whose authority is specifically limited to finding
a purchaser for the property, or who is authorized
simply "to sell" the property, or to negotiate its
sale, has no implied authority, in the absence of
additional circumstances, to receive from the purchaser the purchase price, or any part thereof.

In the case of Lynn v. Northern Federal Loan
Association (1952) 235 Minn. 484, 51 N.W. 2d 588, 30
A.L.R. 2d 799, it was held that the broker's authority
to sell property is ordinarily not inclusive of the right to
receive the purchase money therefor on behaU of his
principal, and payment to him does not constitute payment to the principal in the absence of an expr~ or
implied authorization. The Supreme Court of Minnesota,
in affirming judgment for the plaintiff, held under
circumstances similar to those present in the instant case
that the agent was not, as a matter of law, authorized
to receive payment, and that the question had properly
been submitted to the jury.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BELCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION AS THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF
AGENCY, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS A
:MATIER OF L.<\W, SUFFICIENT TO AUTHORIZE BELCO TO PAY THE SALES PRICE OF THE
PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANT LARSEN AS
AGENT, WITHOUT NOTICE OR PRIOR APPROVAL OF PLAil'.'TIFF.
A Summary Judgment is supported only by a showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. This court has repeatedly held that
in determining the sufficiency of such a showing, the
burden is upon the moving party and the evidence and
inferences therefrom must be considered in a light most
favorable to the party against whom the judgment is
sought.

Apparently the trial court, in deciding the motion,
considered only the aspects of the case most favorable
to Belco. The basis for the court's ruling was that the
telegram constituted sufficient authority as a matter of
law for Larsen to sell the interests and to receive the
purchase price (R 73). This is untenable in view of the
holding of most courts that authority to sell does not
carry with it the right to receive the purchase price,
and particularly in view of all other facts and circumstances.
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The burden was upon Belco to show that no genuine
issues of fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Further, Belco had the burden
of ascertaining the scope and extent of the agency and
having raised such a defense, the burden is upon it to
prove that Larsen had authority to receive the payment
of the proceeds. In the absence of a showing of expre.
authority the scope of such authority is an issue of fact
for jury determination. The party making the payment
to an agent is required to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the agent had the authority, expres,,
or implied, to receive payment on behalf of the principal.
This court has repeatedly followed the familiar rule
from Goddard v. Lexington Motor Co. 63 Utah 161,
165, 223 P. 340, that the existence or nonexistence of
such agency is a question of fact for the jury:
\\Then any evidence is adduced tending to
prove the existence of a disputed agency, its existence or nonexistence is as a general rule a
question of fact for the jury, aided by proper
instructions from the court, even though the evidence is not full and satisfactory, and in such
cases it is error for the court to take the question
from the jury by directing a verdict by instruction,
by non-suit, or by sustaining a demurrer to the
evidence.
Justice Crockett, in his concurring opinion in H olland v. Columbia Iron Afining Co. (1956) 4 Utah 2d 303,
293 P. 2d 700, at page 311 of the Utah RepOTts, summarized the approach a trial judge should take in ruling
upon a motion for summary judgment. Likewise, Justice
Wade, in an opinion dissenting in part in the same case,
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at pages 316 and 317 of the Utah Reports, outlined in
some detail the considerations which should be properly
made before Summary Judgment is granted.
While the facts in the instant case are much stronger
for reversal than in the Holland case, these opinions are
particularly controlling in this case. The trial court in
the instant case exceeded its authority in granting judgment against appellant, thereby wrongfully depriving
her of her right to trial. Certainly when properly viewed
in accordance with all applicable legal principles, reasonable minds would make findings that would make out
a cause of action against Belco Petroleum Corporation
on plaintiff's claim. The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom would much more logically support a
Summary Judgment in favor of appellant than Belco.

POINT III
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
EXIST AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS AGENCY,
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OR APPARENT, SUFFICIENT FOR DEFENDANT BELCO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION TO RELY ON PAYMENT TO
LARSEN AS AGENT OF THE DECEASED.
It is respectfully suggested that if this court now applies the tests set forth in the opinions of Justice Wade
and Justice Crockett in Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Company, supra, there could be no question but that
there are genuine issues of material facts sufficient to
warrant the submission of the case to a jury. There is a
"genuine issue as to any material fact" unless all facts
which affect the rights or liabilities of the parties are
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so conclusively shmvn that there is not the slightest doubt
thereon, and in order to sustain such a judgment, such
facts must show that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. See opinion of Justice
\.\lade in Holland v. Columbia Iron Mining Company,
supra. The court, in deciding such a motion must consider all evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the appellant. It is plaintiff's position that there is no valid legal basis upon
which the judgment of the trial court can be sustained.
There is absolutely no evidence of direct authority
from Kinsley to the defendant Lewis H. Larsen to receive
the cash for the sale of the mineral interests. It has hem
shown that Kinsleys dealt directly with the attorney
for Belco and personally executed all documents and assignments in connection with the conveyance and transfer and that the attorney for Belco, while corresponding
with the Kinsleys immediately prior to the time of the
transfer, did not advise the Kinsleys of the fact that
Belco had entered into an agreement with Larsen, under
the terms of which it intended to pay Larsen, as agent,
for Kinsleys' property, nor of the fact that it intended to
pay Kinsley. The Kinsleys were entitled to believe that
payment would be made directly to them by Belco inasmuch as they had been receiving all royalty and other
payments direct from Belco on the property involved
for some time prior to March, 1962. Further, the defendant Larsen admitted payment by Belco to him on March
22, 1962, (R 2, 29). Larsen, in a letter dated March 26,
1962, indicated to Kinsley that "it appears the deal will
be closed for the full amount of $192,000.00," after he
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had already received the money from Belco and deposited
the same to his account at Walker Bank & Trust Company ( R 56, 5 7a). When considering these facts in light
of the Goddard case, supra, and the general rule of law
that ordinarily such an agent does not have authority to
receive payment, there can be no question but that the
matter should have been submitted to a jury and that
he jury could reasonably and properly find a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.
If in fact the payments of the royalties and other
amounts due under the leases prior to March of 1962,
had been paid to the Larsens without objection by Kinsleys, such would have been evidence of implied authority
to receive the purchase price. But here the contrary situation exists ( R 66) and the fact that Belco was paying
the royalty and other payments due under the leases
direct to the Kinsleys prior to March, 1962, is competent
evidence that Belco did not intend, as far as Kinsley
was concerned, to rely upon the Larsens as an agent and
that Larsen was in fact not an agent for the purpose of
receiving payments of any kind under the lease or of
payment of the purchase price.
In order to establish an inference of such authority,
the conduct of the agent must be known to the principal
and reasonably relied on by the third party. The record
is absent of any showing that the Kinsleys had any
knowledge whatsoever of any misrepresentations of Lewis
H. Larsen to Belco as to his authority. It has been repeatedly held that knowledge of representations of an
agent outside the scope of his authority, cannot be imputed to the principal. Under the facts at bar if anyone
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was misled, it was the decedent Kinsley and plaintiff,
and certainly not Belco.
The fact that the actual documents of conveyance
and assignments were referred back to Lewis H. Lanen
in Salt Lake City is not conclusive under any circumstances of his authority to receive the purchase price, but
is merely one of the facts to be weighed and considered
by a jury in determining the scope of authority of such
an agent. Campbell v. Gowans, ( 1909) 35 Utah 268,
278, 280, 100 P. 397.
Belco was under an aboslute legal duty to inquire
into and prove the extent of authority or limitatioos
thereon as far as Larsen was concerned. Whether Belco
was justified in relying upon the scope of the agency or
the apparent authority of Larsen at most, presented a
further question for jury determination. It is respectfully
submitted that the Summary Judgment should not have
been granted as the evidence does not preclude all rcumiable possibility that appellant could establish a valid
claim at a trial. On the contrary, under the overwhelming
weight of authority, and without exception, the cues
f'xamined show that jury verdicts under similar circumstances have been upheld on appeal.
POINT IV
NO FORMAL POWER OF ATIORNEY WAS
EXECUTED OR RECORDED AND THE DEFENDANT BELCO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, AS
A 1\1ATTER OF LAW, COULD NOT RELY ON
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF LARSEN AS TO
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THE SCOPE OF THE AGENCY AND WAS BOUND
TO ASCERTAIN THE LIMITATIONS THEREOF.
There can be no question but that the overriding
royalty and working interest in the oil and gas lease
constitute an interest in real estate. No power of attorney
was executed or recorded pursuant to 57-1-8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. This statute requires a power of attorney to be acknowledged and recorded in order that
a third party, such as Belco, may rely on the authority
of an agent to act in any matter whereby an interest in
real property may be affected.
Appellant contends that Belco, in addition to being
put on notice of the limitations of the agency as a matter
of law, was bound by the requirements of the statute
relating to powers of attorney before it could, with impunity, deal with Larsen as an agent, particularly without notice to Kinsley.
The ruling of this court in the case of Malia, State
Bank Commissioner, et al, v. Giles, et al, 100 Utah 562,
114 P. 2d 208, supports this proposition that as a matter
of law Belco had no authority under the circumstances to
make payment to Larsen as agent.
The Malia case involved the question of the "apparent authority" of an agent to pledge the principal's
property. The court held that the extent of an agent's
apparent authority is not measured by the extent of
power exercised by the agent; but by the principal's
conduct with reference to the power exercised by the
agent, and that a course of conduct creating an apparent
authority in an agent embraces only those matters which
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are incident to such course of conduct. In determining
what may or may not be included as incidents of that
conduct, the court said that it should not overlook the
requirements of the law as it may by statute or otherwise
be made applicable to such conduct.
Under the Malia case, a greater duty was placed
upon Belco to ascertain the limitations upon Larsen's
agency, in view of our statute which requires a power of
attorney to be acknowledged and recorded before one
may deal with a party as an agent whereby any real
property is affected. This is particularly true in view of
the fact that Belco made all payments for rentals and
royalties from the property in question direct to the
Kinsleys for many months, and, inasmuch as Belco and
its attorneys corresponded with and sent all deeds, assignments, etc. to the Kinsleys for signature, thereby leading
Kinsleys to believe they would receive payment direct as
they were accustomed to. Under such circumstances the
court should rule, as a matter of law, that Belco could
not rely on the representation of Larsen to any extent,
and that the Kinsleys were entitled to believe that payment of the purchase price would be made to them.

POINT V
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT OTHO V. KINSLEY EXECUTED
AND DELIVERED TO LEWIS H. LARSEN ASSIGNMENTS OF ALL HIS INTEREST IN THE
MINERAL LEASES.
Paragraph 2 of the Summary Judgment reads as
follows:
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That prior to 1\farch 22, 1962, Otho V. Kinslev executed and delivered to Lewis H. Larsen
a~ignments of all his interest in and to Utah
Mineral Lease Nos. 13692 and 8366 (R 72).
It is difficult to determine from the reading of the
above finding made by the trial court whether the court
was confused or misled. In any event, the finding is
ambiguow and misleading in that it infers that Kinsley
executed and delivered assignments of his interest in
the leases in favor of Lewis H. Larsen. Such is absolutely
contrary to fact as all of the assignments and documents
of conveyance were executed in favor of Belco Petroleum
Corporation and no claim has been made otherwise
(R 50, 65). Even paragraph 15 of the affidavit of
Lawrence Ruben states that the documents of transfer
were duly executed by Otho V. Kinsley and Mrs. Kinsley
(R 53, 54).
Paragraph 3 of the Findings, to-wit, "that Lewis H.
Larsen did deliver the assignment of Otho V. Kinsley
unto the attorney for the defendant Belco Petroleum
Corporation, and was delivered in exchange for said
aaignment two drafts totaling $384,000.00 made payable
to "Lewis H. Larsen, as agent." is also susceptible of
a double meaning and ambiguous. Paragraph 3 when
read in connection with paragraph 2 indicates that the
court found that the assignments were executed in favor
of Larsen who then delivered the same to Belco and
received the checks. This is absolutely contrary to the
facts and these is no evidence to support such findings.
The findings assure Belco that the facts most favor·
able to it appeared as official findings of the court, but
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ignore most other material facts, from which different inferences mav be drawn. The fact that the documents of
conveyance and assignment in favor of Belco were returned to Larsen by Kinsley is not conclusive of the
question on agency and authority but is a matter of
evidence to be weighed and considered in connection
with all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. See
Campbell v. Gowans, supra.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court
erred in granting a Summary Judgment dismimng the
plaintiff's Complaint as against Belco. The cases, almost
without exception, hold that under the circumstances
of the case the defendant Lewis H. Larsen could not
have been authorized, as a matter of law, to receive the
payment of the sales price of the property as agent and
such payment does not constitute payment to the principal. Under the basic and fundamental rules of agency,
Belco was charged with the absolute duty of inquiry as
to the scope of Larsen's purported authority and in dealing with Larsen under the circumstances did so at its
peril. The loss to the decedent and appellant never would
have occurred had Belco properly performed this duty.
The loss could have been avoided merely by notice to the
decedent by Belco that it intended to pay Larsen as agent,
or by simply making the checks payable jointly to both
Kinsley and Larsen, the record owners of the interests,
in accordance with normal and customary business
methods.
Under cases too numerous to mention, it is clear
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that the trial court exceeded its authority in holding
that there were no genuine issues of fact and that Belco
was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The
evidence, which was largely uncontroverted, and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, would
much more logically support a judgment in favor of
appellant than Belco. At most, the questions concerning
the scope of the agency were issues for jury determination
and not for arbitrary and summary decision based on
incomplete affidavits and counter-affidavits.
The judgment of the trial court was wholly erroneous
and should be reversed reinstating plaintiff's Complaint
against Belco Petroleum Corporation.
Respectfully submitted,
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